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ABSTRACT
A number of states have recently instituted family cap policies, under which women who
conceive a child while receiving cash assistance are not entitled to additional cash benefits upon the birth
of the child. This paper takes advantage of the variation across states in the timing of the policy’s
implementation to determine if family cap policies are discouraging women from having additional
births. Vital statistics birth data for the years 1989 to 1998 offer no evidence that family cap policies lead
to a reduction in births to women ages 15 to 34. The data reject a decline in births of more than one
percent. The finding is robust to multiple specification checks. The data also reject large declines in
higher-order births among demographic groups with relatively high welfare participation rates. Curiously,
the data suggest increases in higher-order births to unmarried black and white high-school dropouts and
to unmarried black teens approximately one year after the implementation of a family cap. The data reject










Over the past decade, states across the country have been experimenting with welfare 
reform. One of the most controversial reform policies, the “family cap” or “child exclusion,” is 
motivated by the notion that an incremental increase in cash assistance for each additional child 
increases a woman’s propensity to bear additional children. With the intention of heightening 
personal responsibility, 18 states have responded to this concern by implementing family caps that 
end the traditional practice of providing families on welfare with additional cash benefits when a 
new child is born into the family. An additional five states have altered the form of the additional 
benefit, but not eliminated it entirely. This paper uses the variation across states in the timing of 
family cap implementation to identify whether the denial of incremental benefits leads to a 
reduction in births. 
A woman’s decision to give birth is part of a complex series of decisions influenced by 
social, religious, economic, and other demographic and personal factors.  The question of how 
welfare benefits affect this decision focuses on the role of economic factors in determining this 
choice.  The primary economic question is whether the availability of fewer resources at the margin 
decreases a woman’s propensity to bear additional children. The potential direct effect of the policy 
is to reduce higher-order births: a decrease in marginal resources raises the price of an additional 
child and may thereby deter a woman from having additional births. Insofar as the policy sends a 
message that welfare is less generous than previously, it may also lead a woman to delay 
childbearing until she is financially secure and thereby reduce first births as well.  
The economic theory underlying this question is that of rational choice, and in particular the 
role of incentives as important determinants of behavior. There is an extensive literature on various 
potential incentive effects of the welfare system. Econometric studies generally show that labor 
supply is reduced by the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and that higher 
potential benefits induce greater participation in this program.  The evidence regarding the effects of 
AFDC on family structure is more mixed, but recent studies have found a weak effect.
1   
Identifying the causal effects of welfare on fertility decisions is not straightforward. A 
regression of the number of births a woman has on the welfare benefits she receives confounds the 
direction of causality. The amount of cash assistance a woman receives is determined by the 
number of children she has.  Many studies have tried to identify the causal relationship by 
                                                           
1 For a survey of the literature see Moffitt (1998, 1992).    3
exploiting cross-sectional variation in state benefit levels and birth rates. The main weakness of this 
strategy is that there may be fixed differences in birth rates across states that can not be controlled 
for in a cross-sectional analysis.  
This paper addresses these problems by using a plausibly exogenous source of variation in 
incremental benefits and data from a panel of states. The nineties was a decade of unprecedented 
welfare reform and experimentation at the state level. The implementation of family caps does not 
appear to be driven by movements in birth rates. Rather, welfare reform has been a political 
movement during the time period being studied and state policies have been adopted based on the 
politics and priorities of the state. For this reason, the legislative “quasi-experiment” is reasonably 
considered exogenous. Furthermore, the variation in timing across the 18 states that eliminate 
incremental benefits provides us with multiple quasi-experiments from which we can identify the 
effect of the policy. The effect of the family cap on fertility behavior is identified using state-level 
panel data: the analysis compares the change in birth rates for a state that implements a family cap 
in a given period to the change in birth rates among states that do not implement a family cap in the 
given period. The analysis controls for level differences in birth rates across states, level differences 
in birth rates across years that are common to all states, and differences in (linear) birth rate trends 
among states.  
Vital statistics birth data for the years 1989 to 1998 offer no evidence that family cap 
policies lead to a reduction in births to women ages 15 to 34. When state effects, month effects, and 
state-specific linear time trends are controlled for, a decline in births of more than one percent can 
be rejected at the 95 percent confidence level. (The upper bound of the confidence interval is an 
increase in births of 1.1 percent.)  This finding of no effect on births is maintained across multiple 
specification checks. The set of confidence intervals around six alternative estimates has a lower 
bound of a one percent decline and an upper bound of a two percent increase. The data also reject 
large declines in higher-order births among demographic groups with relatively high welfare 
participation rates. Curiously, the data suggest increases in higher-order births to unmarried black 
and white high-school dropouts and to unmarried black teens approximately one year after the 
implementation of a family cap. The data reject a decline in births of more than four percent for 
unmarried white high-school graduates and unmarried white teens. 
 
II. Background 
   4
a. Family cap policies 
 
In August of 1996 the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) replaced the AFDC program with a block grant program called Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) and gave states flexibility to create new cash assistance programs for 
families with dependent children, effective July 1997.  Before the passage of the PRWORA 
legislation, many states received waivers from the federal government allowing them to experiment 
with the rules of welfare. Starting with New Jersey in 1992, nineteen states received approval to 
implement family cap policies under waivers. An additional four have implemented family cap 
policies as part of their state TANF programs.  
The AFDC program required all states to increase a family’s benefit amount when an 
additional child was born into the family. In contrast, under most family cap policies there is no 
increase in cash assistance when a child is born to a mother who was receiving welfare at the time 
of conception.
 2 Some states have implemented partial family cap policies: two states provide only a 
partial increase in benefits for an additional child; two others provide the increase in assistance in 
the form of in-kind benefits; and one state gives the incremental increase in cash benefits to a third 
party (e.g., church) to act on behalf of the child. Appendix Table 1 lists policy types and approval 
and implementation dates by state. 
  
b. Other recent welfare reforms 
 
The time period being studied was a time of active welfare reform and experimentation.
3 
Since 1962 the Social Security Act has authorized the Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services to waive specified requirements of the act in order to enable a state to carry out any 
experimental, pilot, or demonstration project that the Secretary deems in accordance with the 
objectives of AFDC.  The Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations all granted such waivers 
                                                           
2 The following example is taken from Camasso et. al. (1999): in the state of New Jersey, under AFDC, a woman on 
welfare with one eligible child would receive $322 per month in cash assistance.  If the woman gave birth to another 
child, the family would receive an additional $102 per month, and an additional $64 per month for any additional births. 
Food stamp benefits would also increase, but by less than the maximum due to the incremental income from AFDC 
benefits.  Under the family cap, the family would continue to receive $322 with the birth of any additional child. The 
food stamp benefit would increase by more, however, though not enough to offset the decline in cash assistance. 
3 Information in this section is taken from the 1998 Green Book, Section 7, From the U.S. Government Printing office 
Online via GPO Access. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/.../105_green_book.   5
liberally. By mid-August 1996, the Clinton administration had approved more than 70 waivers for 
more than 40 states.  
  Many AFDC waiver projects were aimed at encouraging labor force participation and 
human capital development. Restrictive reforms in this vein include tightened work requirements, 
time limits on benefit durations, and benefits linked to school attendance or performance.  
Liberalizing reforms include a more generous treatment of earnings and resources and an increased 
vehicle asset limit. Some states received waivers to expand transitional medical and childcare 
benefits in an effort to encourage recipients to leave the welfare program. Some waivers authorized 
states to expand eligibility for two-parent (unemployed) families, mitigating the discriminatory 
affect of AFDC against dual parent families. Many states incorporated provisions of their AFDC 
waiver projects into their TANF plans. Appendix Table 2 lists approval and implementation dates of 
states’ first major waivers.  
To empirically identify the effect of family cap policies on birth rates, it is necessary to 
control for the effect that other welfare initiatives might have had on fertility decisions. Tightened 
work requirements in the form of less generous child exemptions are such a policy. Under AFDC, 
primary caretaker relatives of children up to six years of age, or up to three if the state guaranteed 
childcare, were exempt from the requirement that adults participate in the Job Opportunities and 
Basic Skills Training (JOBS) program. Thirteen states received waivers to alter their JOBS 
requirements, most commonly to lower the age of the youngest child that qualifies a recipient for a 
work exemption and in some cases to eliminate the caretaker exemption. All states imposed 
tightened work requirements under TANF requiring welfare recipients to work sooner in terms of 
the age of their youngest child. The implementation of stricter requirements may affect fertility 
behavior, since the cost to a woman of having a child is higher when the child does not qualify her 
for a work exemption or does so for a shorter amount of time. The econometric analysis below 
therefore controls for changes in work exemption rules. Appendix Table 3 lists work exemption 
policies and implementation dates by state.  
If women perceive children to be a hindrance to financial self-sufficiency, time limits on 
benefits may affect reproductive decisions by signaling that welfare assistance is only temporary.
4 
AFDC imposed no restrictions on the length of time a family could receive welfare assistance. 
Twenty-four states received waivers to implement benefit time limits and under PRWORA, all 
                                                           
4 A time limit refers to a length of time for which a family can receive cash assistance and after which a family’s benefit 
is either terminated or reduced or the family is required to participate in work requirements   6
states are required to impose benefit time limits.  PRWORA also mandates that state TANF plans 
subject teen parents to stay-in-school and live-at-home provisions. In order to isolate the effect of a 
family cap policy from any effect these restrictive provisions might have had on birth rates, the 
econometric estimation controls for the implementation of time limits and state TANF plans. 
Appendix Table 2 lists time limit and TANF implementation dates.  
 
c. Previous studies on the effect of welfare on fertility  
 
There is a large body of research from the past three decades on the effects of the welfare 
system on family structure. Studies from the 1970s and early 1980s generally fail to demonstrate an 
effect of welfare on marriage and fertility outcomes. Moffitt (1992) provides an overview of this 
early research. A second-wave of studies dating back to the mid-1980s offers mixed findings but 
has led to a tenuous consensus that the welfare system probably does affect marriage and fertility 
outcomes. However, as Moffitt (1998) observes, “there is considerable uncertainty surrounding this 
consensus because a significant minority of the studies finds no effect at all, because the magnitudes 
of the estimated effects vary widely, and because there are puzzling and unexplained differences 
across the studies by race and methodological approach.” 
Many studies utilize cross-state comparisons of benefit levels to estimate the effect of 
welfare on fertility. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Lundberg 
and Plotnick (1990, 1995) find strong effects on pregnancy probabilities and resolution decisions 
for white teenage women but not for blacks. On the other hand, Acs (1994, 1996) analyzes data 
from the NLSY and finds no effect of welfare for either whites or blacks on the probability that a 
woman age 23 to 25 has a second birth nor on the probability that a woman age 14 to 23 has a first 
birth. Duncan and Hoffman (1990) and An, Haveman, and Wolfe (1993) also rely on cross-state 
comparisons of benefit levels but these studies use data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics 
(PSID). The former analyze the fertility decisions of black teens and do not find a significant effect 
of welfare on AFDC-related births. The latter do not find a significant effect on the probability that 
a woman age 13 to 18 has a non-marital birth. 
A weakness of these studies, as well as other studies relying on cross-state comparisons, is 
that the results are potentially biased by unobserved differences across states. Benefit levels and 
fertility decisions may covary across states for reasons other than a direct welfare effect. In an 
analysis of PSID data from 1969 to 1989, Hoynes (1997) confirms that results are sensitive to the   7
inclusion of state fixed effects and explores the possibility that population composition varies across 
states in ways related to welfare program generosity. Her results show that when the estimation 
procedure controls for individual effects, there is no evidence that welfare raises the propensity to 
form female-headed households for either whites or blacks. Similarly, Moffitt (1994), using Current 
Population Survey (CPS) data from 1968 to 1989 and a cross-state comparison of levels, finds 
positive welfare effects for whites on the probability that a woman with less than 12 years of 
education is a household head. But when he controls for state fixed effects in the estimation, he 
finds a negative effect. In contrast, Rosenzweig’s (1999) analysis of NLSY data controls for state 
and cohort fixed effects and finds a significant and quantitatively large positive effect of AFDC on 
nonmarital childbearing through age 22. Hoffman and Foster (2000) demonstrate the sensitivity of 
estimates to the age group examined. They reproduce Rosenzweig’s main findings using data from 
the PSID, but when they examine fertility separately by age, they find an AFDC effect only for 
women in their early twenties and not for teenage women.  
Some recent work focuses on the effect of marginal welfare benefits. Argys and Rees (1996) 
examine the relationship between welfare generosity and fertility behavior using data on an NLSY 
sample of 1,344 unmarried women who received welfare payments at some point between 1979 and 
1991. Controlling for state fixed effects, they find neither the welfare guarantee level nor the 
marginal benefit level to be a significant determinant of conception probability. Robins and Fronstin 
(1996) estimate the effects of changes in benefit increments on family-size decisions among a CPS 
sample of never-married women. Their analysis finds that both the benefit level and the incremental 
benefit for a second child positively affect family size decisions of black and Hispanic women, but 
not of white woman. Fairlie and London (1997) estimate the probability of a higher-order birth for a 
sample of AFDC recipients and a comparison sample of non-AFDC women using data from the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).  They find a stronger effect for the non-AFDC 
sample than for the AFDC sample and therefore conclude that the observed relationship is spurious. 
The literature has demonstrated that the estimation of a fertility effect of welfare is sensitive 
to the data set being analyzed, the age of the population being studied, and the methodology 
employed. The majority of studies have relied on cross-state comparisons, which are potentially 
unable to identify a causal link between welfare and fertility. The present study improves upon 
previous studies in a number of ways. To identify an effect of incremental welfare benefits on 
fertility decisions, the analysis relies on an arguably exogenous source of change in incremental 
benefit levels induced by the political welfare reform movement. The changes in benefits   8
implemented under family cap policies occur at different times across states, so the estimation can 
control for the effects of time. In addition, the analysis uses state-level panel data so the estimation 
can control for state fixed effects. Furthermore, the present study uses vital statistics data on all 
births to all women and can therefore directly observe whether results extend across race and age 
groups. 
 
d. Studies of family cap policies 
 
  Two states, Arkansas and New Jersey, have released evaluations of their family cap policies. 
Both evaluations employ an experimental design: women receiving welfare were randomly assigned 
to a treatment group that was subject to a benefits cap, and a control group that was not. The 
Turturro et al. (1997) evaluation of the Arkansas program for years 1994 to 1997 finds no statistical 
difference in the number of births born to women in the two groups. Camasso et al. (1999) use two 
analytical approaches to evaluate New Jersey’s experience: an experimental design as described 
above and a pre-post analysis of the entire welfare caseload over a 6-year period that includes the 
implementation of the family cap. Both analyses suggest that pregnancies and births among women 
on welfare declined after program implementation and that the number of abortions increased. 
Studies of targeted experiments such as these are always open to questions about whether 
the results apply to other contexts. In addition to this general problem, methodological weaknesses 
inherent in the Arkansas and New Jersey studies make the results of these studies difficult to 
interpret. First, there is evidence that the experimental design was contaminated in both 
demonstrations. Loury (2000) reports that in both demonstrations many members of the treatment 
and control groups did not know which policy applied to them.
5 Furthermore, in New Jersey, more 
than one-quarter of case workers admitted to evaluators that they used discretion when making 
treatment or control assignments, thereby negating the randomness of the assignment. Loury also 
points out that the surveys on which the evaluations were based had low response rates and that the 
respondents were not representative of the larger AFDC caseload.  
In addition to implementation problems, the Arkansas and New Jersey evaluations both 
restrict the analysis to women on welfare, which makes it impossible to identify the effect of the 
                                                           
5 In Arkansas, 46 percent of women in the treatment group and 52 percent in the control group indicated to evaluators 
that they did not know how much more money that would receive if they had an additional child. In New Jersey, only 
39 percent of the actual control group members knew they were in the control group and only 65 percent of treatment 
group members knew that they were subject to new rules (Loury 2000).   9
family cap on fertility behavior separately from the effect on welfare participation. The existence of 
a family cap may lead to compositional changes among the welfare population that preclude the 
analysis from estimating a causal effect on births. On the one hand, a family cap policy may 
encourage women who desire multiple children to find alternative means of financial support, e.g. a 
paying job or a husband. To the extent that this occurs, the welfare population post-family cap 
includes fewer women who desire multiple children. Ceteris paribus, birth rates are unchanged, but 
there are fewer births to women on welfare. On the other hand, the presence of a family cap may 
signal that welfare is not a generous source of financial support, leading some young women to 
delay becoming a mother until they are more financially secure. Some women who might have 
given birth and enrolled in welfare pre-family cap do neither when a family cap policy is in effect. 
Ceteris paribus, birth rates are lower as a consequence of the family cap but there is no change in 
the number of births to women on welfare. Due to these concerns, the empirical analysis below is 
not conditioned on welfare receipt and avoids confounding the effect of the family cap on birth rates 
with the effect on participation.
 6  
In a contemporaneous working paper, Horvath-Rose and Peters (2000) examine aggregate 
vital statistics birth data from 1984 to 1996 to analyze the effect family cap policies have had on 
state-level non-marital birth ratios.
7 Their study concludes that the family cap decreases non-marital 
fertility for all race and age groups. The main regressions of their study control for state and year 
fixed effects, high-school completion rate by adults age 18 to 24, proportion of state population 
living in urban areas, proportion of state population that are fundamentalist adherents, and indicator 
variables for the following welfare policies: minor parent provision waiver, time limit waiver, work 
requirement waiver, AFDC-UP waiver, child support waiver, expanded income disregard and asset 
limit waiver, school attendance and performance requirement waiver, parental consent requirement 
for an abortion, requirement for sex education in schools.  
There are three major limitations to the Horvath-Rose and Peters (2000) framework. First, 
by defining the dependent variable in terms of the non-marital birth ratio, the analysis confounds the 
marriage and fertility responses to the family cap. Furthermore, though marital status is key to their 
study, the authors do not account for the changes in the reporting of marital status in vital statistics 
                                                           
6 Declines in welfare caseloads over the 1990s are well-documented (see Ziliak et al. 2000). Whether welfare reform or 
the robust economy are responsible for the declines, if the composition of the welfare caseload has been altered then 
conditioning the analysis sample on welfare-receipt is problematic. 
7 The non-marital birth ratio is defined as the number of non-marital births divided by the total number of births.   10
data that occurred during the time period they study.
8 Second, there are potential problems with 
their waiver variables, which differ substantially from those in the 1999 CEA report and 1998 
Urban Institute report. Third, the results appear to be implausible. For women ages 20 to 49, the 
analysis finds an immediate decrease of 1.4 percentage points off a base of 21 percent for white 
women and an immediate decrease of 3.1 percentage points off a base of 51 percent for black 
women. For teenage women, their analysis finds immediate decreases of 4.5 percentage points off a 
base of 58 percent among whites and 3.2 percentage points off a base of 87 percent among blacks. 
These results imply an immediate marriage response, third trimester abortions, or large anticipation 
effects. Additionally, it is curious that such a large effect is observed for the entire population of 
women aged 20 to 49, most of whom will never be at-risk of welfare receipt.   
 
III. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
a. Data 
  Data on births are from the 1989 to 1998 Vital Statistics Natality Data, Public-Use Data 
Files compiled by the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). The public-use data files 
include all births occurring within the United States. I limit my sample to births occurring to women 
ages 15 to 34 because women in this age group are more likely to be at-risk of welfare dependence 
– and hence affected by a family cap policy – than older women. The vital statistics data files 
identify the state of residence and month of birth, as well as mother’s education, mother’s race, 
mother’s marital status, and live-birth order. I use this information to create a data file of state birth 
counts.  
Information on welfare policies is obtained from three sources. The first source is a 1999 
technical report of the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), which relied on experts from the 
Department of Health and Human Services as well as non-governmental research institutions. The 
second source is a 1998 Urban Institute report on state TANF programs. The third is a report by 
Crouse (1999), prepared for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which summarizes 
                                                           
8 As reported in the technical appendix of the 1997 vital statistics report, birth certificates in 46 states and Washington 
D.C. include a direct marital status question. Nevada collects marital status information from the electronic birth 
registration process, though it is not included on the birth certificate. This procedure was started in Nevada in 1997, 
after 1995-1996 procedures overestimated the number of births to unmarried women. The remaining three states of 
Connecticut, Michigan, and New York make marital status determinations based on whether a paternity 
acknowledgement was received, the father’s name is missing, and lastly, whether the father’s and mother’s surnames 
are different. A direct question was not added in Texas and California until 1994 and 1997, respectively.    11
information contained in a 1997 report of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
Setting the Baseline: A Report on State Welfare Waivers.  
 
b. Empirical Strategy 
 
  The effect of the family cap on fertility can occur through two channels: conception and 
abortion.  Economic reasoning predicts that the existence of a cap on benefits for additional children 
raises the price of a child and might therefore lead some women to avoid pregnancy or, once 
becoming pregnant, avoid a birth by having an abortion.  This reasoning finds a foundation in 
Becker’s models of the family. Becker (1981) uses the price of children and the real income to 
explain, among other things, why a rise in the wage rate of employed women reduces fertility and 
why various government programs - such as AFDC - might significantly affect the demand for 
children. Assuming that women, on average, respond to a price increase of an additional child, we 
expect that the number of higher-order births in a state that has effectively raised the price of 
additional children will fall relative to a state that has not, all else being constant.  
The analysis of this paper identifies the sum of the conception and abortion responses and 
reports the net effect of the family cap on reproductive behavior. It is estimated at the aggregate 
level, looking at the number of births in a state-month cell. The identification strategy of this paper 
is to compare the change in the number of births occurring in a state that becomes a family cap state 
to the change in the number of births that occurs in states that do not make the family cap transition 
in the same period. Relative to states that have not yet passed a family cap, or that did so in the past, 
this analysis identifies the incremental change in births that is associated with the introduction of the 
family cap.  
The estimation technique applies ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to model fertility 
in state s in month t. The base estimating equation, eq. (1), takes the following form: 
ln(y) st = α  + β 1*famcapst  + β 2*wke1st + β 3*wke2st  + β 4*wke3st  + β 5*ln(welfare 
benefits)sy + β 6*TANFst + β 7*time limitst + β 8*ln(female pop 15-34)sy +  β 9*(prop15-
19) sy +β 10*(prop20-24)sy + β 11*(prop25-29) sy + β 12*(unemp rate) s(t-9)  + γ s +  
σ t +  ξ s ∗ time + ε s t          
The variables are defined as follows: 
yst  – total number of births in state s in month t to women age 15 to 34    12
famcapst – a binary indicator for whether state s implemented a family cap at least 
six-months prior to month t 
wke1st   – work exemption 1 – a binary indicator for whether state s implemented an 
exemption for mothers with a child as old as six months to three years   
wke2st  – work exemption 2 – a binary indicator for whether state s implemented an 
exemption for mothers with a child newly born to six months old 
wke3st  – work exemption 3 – a binary indicator for whether state s removed  
exemptions based on the age of a mother’s child 
welfare benefitssy – the maximum monthly benefit for a family of three on 
AFDC/TANF in state s in year y, expressed in 1998 dollars
9 
TANFst – a binary indicator for whether a state implemented its TANF plan at least 
six-months previous to month t 
time limitst – a binary indicator for whether a state implemented a time limit on 
welfare benefits at least six-months previous to month t 
female pop 15-34sy – the female population age 15 to 34, in state s in year y, based on  
U.S. census figures 
prop15-19 sy,  prop20-24 sy, prop25-29 sy – the proportion of the female population 
age 15 to 34 in the different five-year age groups, in state s in year y; omitted 
category is the proportion age 30 to 34.  
unemp rate s(t-9)  - the average unemployment rate in state s in the six months around 
the month of conception, t-9 
γ s   – a binary indicator for state s 
σ t   – month fixed effects for month t 
ξ s ∗ time −  linear time trend specific to state s 
 
The analysis sample consists of 6,120 observations (51 states over 120 months). The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the total number of births in state s in month t to 
women age 15 to 34. In subsequent specifications, the model is estimated for higher-order births to 
women in more narrowly defined demographic groups. The distribution of total monthly births in a 
state is highly skewed, so a log transformation of the birth count is used. An advantage of this 
transformation is that coefficients reflect percentage changes, which aids in the interpretation of   13
results. A potential problem with defining the dependent variable at the state-level is that the 
analysis will provide unbiased estimates of the effect of the family cap on birth rates only if there is 
not widespread migration in response to family cap policies. This assumption finds support in 
Levine and Zimmerman (1999), which evaluates the extent to which differences in welfare 
generosity across states leads to interstate migration and concludes that welfare-induced migration 
is not a widespread phenomenon.  
  The variable of primary interest is the binary indicator for a family cap. I refer to the 18 
states that between 1989 and 1998 eliminate additional cash assistance for a child born to a mother 
on welfare as “ever-treated” states and to the other 32 states and the District of Columbia as “never-
treated” states. For the never-treated states, the family cap indicator is always equal to zero. For the 
ever-treated states, the family cap indicator takes on a value of one if the observation represents a 
month that occurs at least six months after the state’s family cap policy was implemented. Allowing 
a six-month lag recognizes that conception responses can not take place within nine months of the 
policy implementation and that most abortion responses will occur in the first trimester of 
pregnancy. An alternative specification defines the family cap to incorporate a 12-month lag, which 
assumes that there is no immediate abortion response. 
  The three work exemption variables are included in the model to control for the effect that 
tightened work restrictions might have on fertility decisions. They are mutually exclusive and the 
omitted category is the traditional AFDC/JOBS exemption policy. As discussed above, the relative 
cost of having a child is higher when the child does not exempt the mother from work requirements. 
Economic reasoning thus implies the sign of β 2, β 3,  and β 4   to be non-positive, and since wke1 
represents the least strict non-AFDC policy and wke3 represents the strictest, we expect that 
β 4 <= β 3 <= β 2. Τ he welfare benefit level is controlled for in the model to account for any change in 
benefit levels that may be correlated with the introduction of a family cap policy and affect fertility 
decisions. Eleven states explicitly changed their benefit levels under TANF and the inflation-
adjusted level of benefits declined in almost all states during the nineties. All else equal, a higher 
benefit level makes raising a family on welfare less-costly, and economic reasoning thus predicts 
that the sign on β 5 is positive.  
The model also controls for the implementation of time limits and state TANF plans. As 
discussed above, a time limit on benefit durations may affect reproductive decisions insofar as it 
signals that assistance is temporary and encourages women to delay childbearing until they are 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
9 I thank Robert Shoeni for providing me with this data, which was used in the 1999 CEA report.   14
financially secure. TANF plans may affect fertility behavior through mechanisms other than a 
family cap; all state TANF plans subject teen parents to stay-in-school and live-at-home provisions. 
The advantage of including these control variables in the model is that the estimated effect of the 
family cap will not include any effect these restrictive provisions may have on birth rates. A 
potential disadvantage is that the data may not have enough statistical power to separately identify 
partial effects for highly correlated welfare reform variables, especially in empirical specifications 
that limit the sample to narrowly defined demographic groups. Robustness checks are performed to 
determine whether the estimated effect of the family cap is sensitive to the inclusion of these 
controls. 
  The regression model explicitly controls for the natural logarithm of the female population 
age 15 to 34. If the female population is trending non-linearly, then the state-specific linear time 
trend will not adequately capture population movements, which undoubtedly affect birth counts. 
The proportion of women in each five-year age group is also controlled for, to account for 
idiosyncratic demographic shifts that might be spuriously correlated with the implementation of 
family cap policies. Data on population are obtained from the U.S. census bureau. The model also 
explicitly controls for the average state unemployment rate in the three months before and three 
months after conception. This variable is included to capture shifts in economic conditions that are 
not uniform across states nor are adequately described by a linear state trend. Individual state fixed 
effects are accounted for in the regression to control for level differences in birth rates across states. 
(Ever-treated states have higher birth totals than never-treated states on average.)  Indicator 
variables for the particular month are included to account for any idiosyncratic movements in birth 
rates common to all states.     
The identification strategy relies on the assumption that birth rates in states that implement 
family caps are not trending differently than birth rates in other states pre-family cap. This 
assumption is tantamount to assuming that the introduction of family cap legislation is exogenous to 
birth rate trends. Two empirical tests support this assumption. First, Figure 1 plots annual fertility 
rates, defined as births per 1,000 women in the relevant age group. The data reveal no sign of 
divergent trends prior to the mid-1990s for either women age 15 to 19 or women age 20 to 34. 
Second, as discussed below, the data suggest that the approval of a family cap waiver is not 
positively associated with births, which would be the case if an increase in birth rates led a state to 
request a waiver to implement a family cap. Nonetheless, one would prefer not to have to rely on 
this assumption. To relax it to some degree, the model is estimated with controls for state-specific   15
time trends, denoted in months. These controls allow fertility rates to trend uniquely, albeit linearly, 
for each state without undermining the viability of this empirical strategy.   
 
IV. Results and Conclusion 
 
a. Differences in fertility rates, by treatment status and demographic group 
 
Table 1 lists mean total monthly births and fertility rates for the overall sample of states. It 
also lists birth counts separately for never-treated states pre- and post-1996 and for ever-treated 
states pre- and post- family cap implementation (with a six-month lag).
10 The first row of the table 
reports that for women age 15 to 24, the average monthly fertility rate – defined as births per 1,000 
women – declines from an average of 7.6 to 7.4 in ever-treated states and from 7.6 to 7.3 in never-
treated states. There was no change in the average monthly fertility rate among women age 20 to 34 
in either group of states. The fall in the fertility rate of teens was slightly greater in never-treated 
states. Under the assumption that fertility rates would have trended similarly in the two groups of 
states in the absence of the policy intervention, these unadjusted “difference-in-differences” imply 
that the family cap did not noticeably affect fertility rates of women age 15 to 34. Figure 1 makes 
the point visually that at no point between 1989 and 1998 does average monthly fertility decline 
more sharply (or increase less steeply) for states that implement caps relative to states that do not.  
One problem with looking at the fertility rates of all women age 15 to 34 is that many 
women will never be at-risk of welfare dependence and therefore will not respond to welfare reform 
initiatives such as the family cap. To narrow the analysis, twelve demographic groups are identified 
based on race
11, marital status, and education. Women age 20 to 34 are divided into high-school 
graduates and high-school dropouts; women age 15 to 19 are classified simply as teens in order to 
avoid mislabeling young women still in school as dropouts. According to data from the March 1989 
Current Population Survey (CPS), unmarried high-school dropouts have the highest welfare 
participation rate – 61.9 percent among black women and 36.9 percent among white women. The 
rate among unmarried high-school graduates is 22.0 percent among blacks and 5.5 percent among 
whites.  
                                                           
10 The year 1996 is chosen as the breakpoint for never-treated states because only one state implements a family cap 
after 1996. 
11 For ease of exposition, women whose race is not classified as “black” in the natality files are considered “white”.   16
Unadjusted difference-in-difference calculations suggest that relative to states that did not, 
states that implemented family caps experienced a greater decline in the number of births born per 
month to white unmarried high-school dropouts, but not in the number of births born to black 
unmarried high-school dropouts. The same is true for births born to unmarried high-school 
graduates. However, states that implemented family caps also experienced larger relative declines in 
the total number of births born to married white women. As the proportion of married women who 
receive welfare is extremely low (5.3 percent among high-school dropouts and 1.2 percent among 
graduates), this suggests that something other than the family cap is driving these trends. Indeed, the 
regression-adjusted estimates for these groups show no relative decline, as discussed below.   
Population estimates are not available for these narrowly defined demographic groups so it 
is not easily determined whether differential demographic shifts are behind these trends. To be 
clear, the birth totals listed for the twelve demographic groups in Table 1 do not account for 
demographic shifts in the composition of the female population. The top panel of Table 1 shows 
that mean monthly birth totals fall more in ever-treated states even though fertility rates do not. This 
discrepancy suggests that population demographics shifted differently between the two groups of 
states. This highlights the importance of accounting for state-specific time trends and population 
demographics in the regression analysis.  
 
b. Regression results - all births to women 15 to 34 
  
Table 2 displays the results from estimating equation (1) and six specification checks for the 
full sample of women age 15 to 34. In the base specification the dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of the total number of births in state s in month t. The family cap indictor equals one if 
the state of observation eliminated benefits for an additional child six or more months previous to 
the month of observation. The base specification controls for state effects, month effects, state-
specific linear time trends, population demographics, lagged state unemployment, and the full set of 
welfare reform variables. The table reports robust standard errors that incorporate White’s 
correction for an arbitrary covariance structure between observations within a state and year (see 
Bertrand et al. 2001)
12.  
The estimation of equation (1) yields a point estimate of the effect of a family cap of 0.002, 
with a standard error of 0.005. The 95% confidence interval around this estimate ranges from a 
                                                           
12 This is implemented using the “cluster” command in STATA.   17
negative effect of 0.8 percent to a positive effect of 1.1 percent. The data reject the hypothesis that a 
family cap leads to a decline in births of one percent or more. Benefit levels have a statistically 
significant positive effect on birth rates and unemployment has a statistically significant negative 
effect. Controls for the implementation of tightened work exemptions, a time limit on benefits, and 
a state TANF plan enter the model insignificantly. This finding of no effect is maintained across the 
six alternative specifications. The set of confidence intervals around the six alternative estimates has 
a lower bound of –0.01 and an upper bound of .02.  
The specification presented in column 2 removes the time limit and TANF variables from 
the model. The motivation for this specification is that it may be difficult for the data to parse out 
the effects of highly correlated welfare reform variables, and perhaps this is why estimation of 
equation (1) fails to detect a negative effect of the family cap. The results do not support this 
explanation; the estimated coefficient on the family cap indicator is unchanged. Column 3 displays 
the estimated coefficients when the model does not account for differential time trends across states. 
Perhaps the time trend variables in the base specification are capturing the variation in birth rates 
that would otherwise identify a family cap effect. The results do not support this explanation either. 
The point estimate of β 1 remains 0.002.  
In the specification listed in column 4, the family cap indicator incorporates a twelve-month 
lag. The base case of a six-month lag allows an initial abortion response from women in their first 
trimester of pregnancy; a twelve-month lag assumes more time is needed for a response. The 
estimated coefficient is positive and significant: 0.009 with a standard error of .004. This is a 
surprising result, as there is no reason to suspect that the elimination of benefits for an additional 
child leads to an increase in births. The result will be explored in more detail below.   
The specification in column 5 investigates the effect of the approval of a family cap policy, 
rather than the implementation. The estimated coefficient is 0.002, the same as in columns 1, 2, and 
3. This finding affirms the assumption that family cap policies are not adopted in response to 
positive shifts in birth rates. A more skeptical interpretation is that the adoption of a family cap is 
positively correlated with births, but that it is offset by an “anticipation” effect whereby women 
avoid pregnancy when they learn that a family cap will soon be imposed. Because there appears to 
be no decline in births after the family cap is implemented, this interpretation seems highly 
unlikely.
13  
                                                           
13 Another way to potentially address endogeneity is to distinguish between states that adopted the family cap as part of 
TANF and those that requested family cap waivers. States that request waivers are arguably more likely to be   18
The two final specification checks reported alter the form of the dependent variable.  The 
regression reported in column 6 estimates the equation for the natural logarithm of the fertility rate. 
The mean fertility rate across the 6,120 state-month cells in the sample is 7.6 births per 1,000 
women. Defining the dependent variable this way essentially moves the natural logarithm of the 
female population age 15 to 34 from the right-hand side of the equation to the left- hand side, i.e. it 
restricts the coefficient on the population variable to be one. In this specification, the estimated 
effect lies between a decrease of 0.6 percent in the fertility rate and a 1.1 percent increase. Again, 
the data suggest that if the effect of the family cap is negative, it is smaller in absolute terms than 
one percent.   
The final specification defines the dependent variable as the natural logarithm of the non-
marital birth ratio – defined as the number of births to unmarried women divided by the total 
number of births – as do Horvath-Rose and Peters (2000). The estimated coefficient on the family 
cap indicator is –0.0003 with a standard error of 0.006. In contrast, Horvath-Rose and Peters (2000) 
find a statistically significant lagged decline in the non-marital ratio of women age 20 to 49: they 
estimate a decline of eleven percent for white women and approximately eight percent for black 
women. The data in the present analysis reject a negative effect larger than 1.2 percent for all 
women age 15 to 34 at the 95 percent confidence level. 
 
c. Regression results – higher-order births, by demographic group  
  
The above analysis fails to detect a decline in births associated with the implementation of a 
family cap.  But perhaps additional births to women at-risk of welfare dependence comprise only a 
small fraction of births born to women ages 15 to 34, making it statistically difficult for the analysis 
to detect an effect. In order to target the analysis to fertility decisions that are potentially affected by 
welfare reform, I limit the analysis on higher-order births.
14 In addition, equation (1) is estimated 
separately for the twelve demographic groups defined above to so that we can compare estimated 
effects across populations with different welfare participation rates. The trade-off inherent to this 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
responding to shifts in birth outcomes than are those states that implement a cap as part of the national reform of 
welfare. However, 19 out of the 23 states that enact any type of family cap legislation requested waivers to do so, 
making the exercise meaningless. Instead, I re-estimate equation (1) after dropping the set of five states that had waivers 
approved before 1995 when a family cap was still a novel idea. The point estimate in this specification is –0.002, with a 
standard error of .009.  
14 Point estimates for the effect of the family cap on first births are not significantly different from zero; results are listed 
in Schettini (2000).    19
approach is that while the power of the analysis is strengthened by the focus on a more targeted 
sample, it is weakened by a decrease in sample size. 
Table 3a reports the results for the eight demographic groups age 20 to 34 and Table 3b 
reports results for the four groups of teenage women. The estimated effect of the family cap is not 
statistically different from zero for any of the groups, but the standard errors are roughly five times 
as large as the standard errors for the full sample estimates. Estimating equation (1) for higher-order 
births born to black, unmarried high-school dropouts yields a coefficient of 0.057 on the family cap 
indicator, with a standard error of 0.025. With a welfare participation rate of 62 percent, this is the 
group most likely to be affected by welfare reform. The estimated coefficient on the family cap 
indicator for white, unmarried high-school dropouts – the group with the second highest rate of 
welfare participation – is also curiously positive and statistically significant.
15 It is investigated 
further in Table 4.  
A sizeable percentage of black, unmarried high-school graduates receive welfare – 22 
percent, according to the 1989 March CPS. But the data provide no evidence that a family cap leads 
to a decrease in higher-order births among this group either. The estimated coefficient is 0.010; the 
95 percent confidence interval for additional births extends from a decline of 2.7 percent to an 
increase of 4.7 percent. Black, married high-school dropouts also report a relatively high rate of 
welfare participation, 12.9 percent. But women in this group also appear to be unresponsive to the 
family cap. The data yield a point estimate of 0.042, with a 95 percent confidence interval ranging 
from –0.033 to 0.118.  
The other demographic groups listed in Table 3a have low rates of welfare participation and 
not surprisingly, do not appear to respond to the implementation of a family cap. As shown in Table 
3b, the data do not suggest a family cap effect among teenage women either. The estimated 
coefficient on the family cap indicator is –0.012 for higher-order births to unmarried white teens, 
with a standard error of 0.014. The data reject a decline of more than four percent at the 95 percent 
confidence level. The estimated coefficient is 0.069 for unmarried black women and is curiously 
statistically significant.   
A potential objection to looking separately at births to unmarried and married women is that 
marriage decisions may be affected by the introduction of a family cap. Some pregnant unmarried 
women may respond to a family cap by getting married. If this were the case, the data would   20
indicate a decrease in births to unmarried women and a corresponding increase in births to married 
women. However, the results in Tables 3a and 3b do not suggest that the introduction of a family 
cap is associated with an increase in the number of higher-order births born to married women.  
Table 4 explores the positive coefficient on the family cap indicator found among three 
samples of women: black unmarried high-school dropouts, white unmarried high-school dropouts, 
and black unmarried teens. For the sake of completeness, the table also reports results for white 
unmarried teens. The family cap indicator is replaced with a set of seven indicator variables that 
control for three-month intervals before and after the implementation of the family cap: three to six 
months before, zero to two months before, one to three months after, four to six months after, seven 
to nine months after, ten to twelve months after, and more than a year after. If the positive 
coefficient is picking up a spurious correlation between birth rates and the introduction of a family 
cap policy, this might be evidence that the policy “exogenous” to birth rates. The results of this 
exercise suggest that this is not the case. For unmarried high-school dropouts, the positive 
association does not appear until more than a year after the family cap has been implemented. For 
unmarried black teenagers the positive association does not appear until several months after the 
policy. There is some spurious positive association that is not explained by population shifts nor 
unemployment rates. When additional years of data become available, future research should 
explore this curious finding.  
To explore this positive estimate further, I estimate equation (1) for higher-order births to 
high-school dropouts with the dependent variable specified as the natural logarithm of the non-
marital birth ratio, rather than the natural logarithm of the total number of births. The estimated 
effect on the non-marital birth ratio of high-school dropouts is not significantly different from zero 
for either white or black women. The estimated coefficient on the family cap indicator is –0.015 for 
blacks, with a standard error of 0.013, and 0.012 for whites, with a standard error of 0.013. This 
implies that there was not an upward shift in births to unmarried women relative to married women, 
which provides some assurance that there is not some confounding factor affecting the fertility 
decisions of women with high rates of welfare participation.  
 
d. Discussion and policy implications 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
15 This finding stands in stark contrast to the finding of Camasso et al. (1999) in the case of New Jersey’s family cap. 
Their study reports that births declined by nine percent among longer-term welfare recipients and by twelve percent   21
This paper has found no systematic effect of the family cap on fertility rates. The data reject 
a decline in births of more than one percent to women age 15 to 34. The data detect no significant 
decline in higher-order births among demographic groups with relatively high welfare participation 
rates. If this empirical result is correct, then the widespread adoption of the family cap as a state 
welfare policy appears ineffective at best and misguided at worst. Women are not responding by 
having fewer additional births, and consequently, fewer resources are being provided per child on 
welfare.  
Future research could help determine whether these results are conclusive. The data suggest 
that for some demographic groups there is a positive shift in births several months after a family cap 
policy is implemented. The present analysis is unable to account for this curious result. In addition, 
the analysis incorporates limited post-family cap data. Most states that eliminated cash assistance 
for additional children did so in 1995 and 1996 and vital statistics birth data is only available 
through 1998. It is possible that effects on fertility will not be evident for another couple years. 
When additional years of natality data become available, future research should examine the 
positive association and investigate whether the finding of no response holds in the long run. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
among their sample of new applicants.   22
 
Figure 1: Monthly Fertility Rates 
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Table 1 
Mean Monthly Birth Totals 
1989 to 1998 
    Overall   Never-treated  Ever-treated  














                   
all women age 15-34    5,809   5,221  4,933   7,362   6,152  -922 
per 1,000 women    7.6   7.6  7.3   7.6   7.4  0 
                  
all women age 20-34    4,988   4,486  4,222   6,328   5,288  -776 
per 1,000 women    8.5   8.5  8.5   8.5   8.5  0 
                  
all female teens 15-19    820   735  711   1,034   863  -147 
per 1,000 women    5.0   4.7  4.1   4.8   4.4  0 
                  
              
              
unmarried HS dropouts age 20-34              
(1) black      130   127  105   153   136  5 
(2) white    283   196  228   472   291  -213 
                  
unmarried HS grads age 20-34              
(3) black      371   332  316   450   463  29 
(4) white    546   466  554   666   583  -171 
                
married HS dropouts age 20-34              
(5) black      30   32  23   35   25  -1 
(6) white    432   346  307   690   392  -259 
                
married HS graduates age 20-34              
(7) black      252   233  200   303   306  36 
(8) white    2,996   2,806  2,530   3,630   3,118  -236 
                
unmarried teens                
(9) black      236   212  191   295   288  14 
(10) white    380   318  378   480   408  -132 
                
married teens                
(11) black      21   21  11   21   12  1 
(12) white    276   209  150   276   167  -50 
Sources: Vital Statistics Natality Data, Public-Use Data Files, years 1989 to 1998, compiled by the U.S. National Center for 
Health Statistics (NCHS); annual population estimates by state and age group are from the U.S. census bureau (figures are 
not available by race.) 
Notes: The set of "ever-treated" states includes the 18 states that eliminated additional cash benefits between 1989 and 1998;  
“post-family cap” is defined as six months after the implementation of the family cap policy. 
The proportion of demographic group on welfare (not restricted to mothers), based on weighted means from the 1989 March 
Current Population Survey: 1) 61.9, n= 267; 2) 36.9, n=820;  3) 22.0, n=1,077; 4) 5.5, n=5,843;  5) 12.9, n=75; 6) 5.3, 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table 1 
State family cap policies 
 






















for add.  
child 













                     
Arizona   11/95  5/95   X               
Arkansas   7/94    4/94    X              
California   9/97    8/96    X           
Connecticut  1/96   12/95      X          
Delaware   10/95  5/95   X               
Florida   10/96  6/96       X           
Georgia   1/94    11/93    X               
Idaho   7/97    -    X               
Illinois   12/95  9/95   X               
Indiana   5/95    12/94    X               
Maryland   3/96    8/95              X   
Massachusetts   11/95  8/95   X               
Mississippi   10/95  9/95   X               
Nebraska   11/95    2/95    X           
New  Jersey   10/92  7/92   X               
North Carolina    7/96    2/96    X               
North Dakota    7/97    -    X               
Oklahoma    10/96   -      X      
South  Carolina   10/96  5/96           X       
Tennessee   9/96    7/96    X          
Virginia   7/95    7/95    X               
Wisconsin   1/96    6/94    X            
Wyoming   1/97    -    X           
Source: Urban Institute (1998) summary of state TANF policies; Crouse (1999) - note these are the same dates used in the 1999 
CEA report; Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Setting the Baseline: A Report on State 
Welfare Waivers 
Notes: Nineteen of the 23 states requested family cap waivers. Idaho, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Wyoming implemented 
family caps as part of their TANF programs. 




Appendix Table 2 
Welfare policy dates: AFDC waivers, TANF, and Time limits  
 
    AFDC  waiver   TANF  implemented   Time  limit 
implemented 
   Implemented   Approved         Actual    
                    
Alabama           12/96      12/96 
Alaska          7/97        7/97 
Arizona   11/95  5/95   11/95        11/95 
Arkansas  7/94   4/94   -       - 
California    12/92   10/92   -   1/98   - 
Colorado   -    -    7/97       7/97 
Connecticut   1/96    8/94    1/98        1/98 
Delaware   10/95  5/95   7/97        7/97 
District of 
Columbia 
 -   -   3/97        3/97 
Florida   10/96  6/96   2/94        2/94 
Georgia   1/94    11/93    1/97        1/97 
Hawaii   2/97    6/94    2/97        2/97 
Idaho   7/97    8/96    7/97        7/97 
Illinois   11/93    11/93    2/96        2/96 
Indiana   5/95    12/94    5/95        5/95 
Iowa   10/93  8/93   10/93        10/93 
Kansas   -      8/96    10/96        10/96 
Kentucky   -    -    10/96       10/96 
Louisiana   -    2/96   1/97        1/97 
Maine   -    6/96    11/96        11/96 
Maryland  3/96   8/95   1/97        1/97 
Massachusett
s 
 11/95  8/95   12/96        12/96 
Michigan   10/92  8/92  --       -- 
Minnesota   -    -    7/97        7/97 
Mississippi   10/95  9/95   10/96    7/97    10/96 
Missouri   6/95    4/95    7/97     7/97 
Montana   2/96   4/95    2/97        2/97 
Nebraska   10/95  2/95   11/95        11/95 
Nevada   -   -   12/96      12/96 
New 
Hampshire 
 -   6/96    10/96        10/96 
New  Jersey   10/92  7/92   4/97    7/97    4/97 
New Mexico    -    -    7/97        7/97 
New York    -    -    12/96    11/97    12/96 




Appendix Table 2 (cont’d) 
Welfare policy dates: AFDC waivers,  TANF, and Time limits  
 
    AFDC  waiver   TANF  implemented   Time  limit 
implemented 
   Implemented   Approved  Official   Actual    
North 
Carolina 
 7/96   2/96    1/97        7/96 
North 
Dakota 
 -   -   7/97        7/97 
Ohio   7/96    3/96    10/96        10/97 
Oklahoma   -    -    10/96        10/96 
Oregon   2/93    7/92    10/96        7/96 
Pennsylvania   -    -    3/97        3/97 
Rhode Island    -    -    5/97        5/97 
South 
Carolina 
 -   5/96    10/96        10/96 
South 
Dakota 
 6/94   3/94    12/96       12/96 
Tennessee   9/96   7/96   10/96        10/96 
Texas   6/96    3/96    11/96        6/96 
Utah   1/93    12/92    10/96        1/97 
Vermont   7/94    4/93    9/96      -- 
Virginia   7/95    7/95    2/97      7/95 
Washington   1/96    9/95    1/97        8/97 
West 
Virginia 
 2/96   7/95    1/97        1/97 
Wisconsin   1/96   6/94   9/96   9/97   10/96 
Wyoming   -    -    1/97        1/97 
                    
Total       34            47   
Sources: Crouse (1999) – note these are the same dates used in the 1999 CEA report; Health and Human 
Services, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Setting the Baseline: A Report on State Welfare 
Waivers; Urban Institute (1998) summary of state TANF policies. 
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Appendix Table 3 
Caretaker Work Exemption Policies, 
Date of Implementation by Age of Youngest Child  
 




















                    
Alabama                1 year  11/96 (T)   
Alaska             1  yaer  7/97  (T)   
Arizona                1 year  10/96 (T)   
Arkansas          3 mos  7/97 (T)         
California          6 mos  1/98 (T)         
Colorado   county  option  (T)               
Connecticut                1 year  10/96 (T)   
Delaware          13 weeks  3/97 (T)         
D.C.          1 year  3/97 (T)         
Florida          3 mos  10/96 (T)         
Georgia    no ex.  1/97 (T)               
Hawaii          6 mos  2/97 (W)         
Idaho    no ex.  7/97 (T)               
Illinois                1 year  7/97 (T)   
Indiana
1                1 year  10/96 (T)   
Iowa    no ex.  1/97 (T)    3 mos  10/93 (W)         
Kansas                1 year  10/96 (T)   
Kentucky                1 year  10/96 (T)   
Louisiana                1 year  1/97 (T)   
Maine                1 year  11/96 (T)   
Maryland          12 weeks  10/96 (W)    1 year  12/96 (T)   
Massachusetts        6 mos  9/96 (T)         
Michigan    no ex.  10/94 (W)    3 mos  9/96 (T)         
Minnesota                1 year  9/97 (T)   
Mississippi                1 year  9/97 (T)   
Missouri                1 year  12/96 (T)   
Montana    no ex.  2/97  (W)               




  1 year  12/96 (T)   
Nevada                1 year  12/96 (T)   
New 
Hampshire 
            3  years  (T)  
New Jersey          12 weeks  7/97 (T)    2 years  10/92 (W)   
New Mexico                1 year  7/97 (T)   
New York                1 year  11/97 (T)   
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Appendix Table 3 (cont’d) 
Caretaker Work Exemption Policies, 
Age of Youngest Child and Date of Implementation  
 




















                    
North 
Carolina 







        3 mos  7/97 (T)         
Ohio                1 year  10/96 (T)   
Oklahoma                1 year  10/96 (T)   
Oregon          3 mos  2/93 (W)         
Pennsylvania                1 year  3/97 (T)   
Rhode Island                1 year  5/97 (T)   
South 
Carolina 
              1 year  10/96 (T)   
South 
Dakota 
        12 weeks  12/96 (T)         
Tennessee          16 weeks  9/96 (W)         
Texas               4  years ?   
Utah    no ex.  10/96 (T)               
Vermont          16 weeks  7/94 (W)    18 mos  9/96 (T)   
Virginia                18 mos  10/97 (T)   
Washington                1 year  1/97 (T)   
West 
Virginia 
              1 year  1/97 (T)   
Wisconsin          12 weeks  9/97 (T)    1 year  1/96 (W)   
Wyoming          3 months  1/97 (T)         
                    
Total                    
                    
Notes: Under TANF, 26 states exempt a mother while the youngest child is under 1 year of age; Vermont and Virginia 
allow an exemption up to 18 months; Texas is the only state to have a higher age limit, set at 4 years, but the exemption 
may only be used once for each family. 
1. Indiana law only allows exemptions for care of a child under 12 weeks if child is conceived while family is on aid. 
Sources: Crouse (1999) – note these are the same dates used in the 1999 CEA report; Health and Human Services, 
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Setting the Baseline: A Report on State Welfare Waivers; Urban 
Institute (1998) summary of state TANF policies. 
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